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 Research background and major research hypotheses 1
 
Despite the long standing traditions of its oil and gas industry, favourable geological 
conditions and location, as well as its developed natural gas infrastructure, the 
Hungarian natural gas market is still in a fragile situation. This is reflected by the fact 
that natural gas has become the synonym of Russian dependence, high heating bills for 
households and – as a consequence of the 2009 January gas crisis and the present 
Russia-Ukraine conflict – energy supply security risk in recent years. 
 
The performance of the Hungarian gas wholesale market in the five years between the 
fall of 2008 (the beginning of the last economic recession) and 2013 reflects its 
inefficiency. On the North-West European core markets oversupply and increased 
competition resulted in wholesale natural gas prices 20-40% below the oil-indexed 
price, which has been the benchmark for Hungary
1
 (see Figure 1). In those five years 
Hungarian customers could benefit from favourable West-European market trends only 
due to regulatory intervention.  
 
Figure 1. The development of oil-indexed, spot, and mixed natural gas prices, January 2008 – December 
2013 
Source: REKK analysis 
                                                 
1
 This margin remained even in the period of increasing spot gas prices after the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster on March 11, 2011 and the follow-up demand shock caused by increased Japanese demand for 
liquified natural gas (LNG). From October 2013 Gazprom finally adjusted its supply price much closer to 
market levels for its Hungarian partners (E.ON and then MVM). 
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The primary objective of this study is to identify the principal conditions for a transition 
from monopolistic (oil-indexed)
2
 natural gas wholesale pricing to hub-based pricing in 
Hungary. It is also about simulating the wholesale price impacts of policy measures to 
remove the obstacles to efficient gas wholesale competition in the country.  
 
The major hypothesis of the paper is that the major obstacles to efficient gas wholesale 
competition and related pricing to develop are the followings in Hungary:  
(i) Exclusive control over a pivotal infrastructure, the (Russia-)Ukraine-Hungary 
interconnector (in the followings: UA-HU interconnector), that ensures a 
dominant market position for the Russian supplier.  
(ii) The present major Russian long term contract (LTC), held by a single Hungarian 
wholesaler, as a principal source of wholesale market concentration. 
(iii) Regulatory constraints to market development; this study will concentrate on 
identifying potentially distortive access rules to critical interconnectors.  
Table 1 below summarises the assumed relationship between the combinations of 
obstacles (i) and (ii) above to gas wholesale market competition and gas wholesale 
pricing regimes.  
 
Table 1. Assumed relationship between the combinations of obstacles to gas wholesale market 
competition and gas wholesale pricing regimes 
 
 
1.1 The pivotal nature of the Russian supplier to meet natural gas demand in 
Hungary 
 
While in the short term lost Russian shipments through the UA-HU interconnector can 
be replaced by storage withdrawal, stored working gas can’t be considered as additional 
                                                 
2
 Oil-indexed natural gas pricing should not be considered monopolistic in general. Such a pricing regime 
serves as a wholesale price risk management tool on e.g. liquefied natural gas markets. However, since 
the development of liquid gas hubs in Europe since 2008, oil indexed natural gas pricing became the 
synonym of monopolistic product pricing in the Central Eastern European context. This is why I use these 
expressions as synonyms in this paper 
With LTC Without LTC With LTC Without LTC
High market concentration level Oil indexed Monopolistic Partially oil-indexed Oligopolostic
Low market concentration level Partially oil-indexed
Dominant price 
leadership
Oligopolistic / 
Competitive
Competitive 
Pivotal infrastructure No pivotal infrastructure
MARKET 
CONCENTRATION
POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN SUPPLIER
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supply source on an annual or longer basis. Thus, when judging the pivotal nature of the 
UA-HU interconnector and related Russian supplies in meeting annual or longer term 
demand, I disregard from storage and, by following REKK (2011a), use the concept of 
leverage (L) in the following manner: 
𝐿 =
𝐶−𝑃−𝐼𝑤
𝐶
     (1) 
when C is annual gross natural gas consumption, P is for annual maximum domestic 
natural gas production capacity and Iw indicates aggregate gas import capacity from 
non-Russia-Ukraine directions. Positive values of this indicator mean that 
(unconstrained) annual consumption can’t be met from domestic production plus 
potentially non-Russia controlled import directions. 
 
Figure 2 indicate the development of the components of the leverage measure and its 
values for Hungary between 2007 and 2013.  
 
Figure 2. The development of the components of the leverage (L) measure and its values for 
Hungary between 2007 and 2013 
 
Source: own calculations based on FGSZ data 
 
For the period 2011-2013 the values of the measure are 0.37, 0.35 and 0.27, 
respectively. This means that for these years 37%, 35% and 27% of annual natural gas 
consumption could only be covered from the UA-HU direction. By recalculating the 
formula in (1) when adding the planned SK-HU import capacity, we arrive at a value of 
–0.21 for 2013.  
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1.2 The leverage function 
 
For policy making a more dynamic and fruitful application of formula (1) is to consider 
it as an energy policy objective function. I call it the leverage function, where the policy 
objective is to undermine, at minimum cost, the pivotal nature of a critical infrastructure 
that ensures a dominant market position for a supplier with exclusive rights to use the 
given infrastructure.  
)),,,((
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

     (2) 
The pivotal position is undermined when the value of L reaches a non-marginal negative 
value, say -0.2. At that point the supplier will know, with a fair level of certainty, that 
the infrastructure it controls is not any more pivotal in serving a given market. This 
poses a credible threat that monopolistic (e.g. oil-indexed) priced supply through the 
pivotal infrastructure
3
 will face effective competition from gas shipped to the market 
from alternative directions.  
 
The domain of the L function is [-∞; 1] and its value depends on both demand and 
supply side variables.  
 
First, it depends on the demand for natural gas (C), which in turn depends on the price 
of gas for end-customers ( ) and the level of exogenous energy efficiency investments 
(E)
4
 that result in reduced natural gas consumption. End customer natural gas price is 
composed of the wholesale price of gas (p), regulated gas price components (e.g. system 
use charges, denoted by r) and taxes (t). The partial derivatives of C with regard to both 
  and E are negative. 
 
                                                 
3
 When monopolistic pricing arrangements (e.g. oil-indexed pricing) cancel due to e.g. the termination of 
long term contracts, this can be replaced by monopolistic pricing based on capacity withholding on the 
pivotal infrastructure.   
4
 An increase in relative gas prices will encourage an increase in energy efficiency investments by 
increasing their profitability. These investments will decrease gas demand ceteris paribus and will be 
reflected in empirical gas demand functions. I will call these investments endogenous energy efficiency 
investments because they are related to changes in end customer gas prices. Exogenous energy efficiency 
investments, on the other hand, are energy efficiency investments largely independent from changes in 
relative gas prices. Typical examples are government subsidised building refurbishments programs.       
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Second, the value of L depends on the level of domestic natural gas production. Within 
the constraints of principal gas reserves in a country, the level of production activity (P) 
will depend on the wholesale price of gas (p) in relation to production marginal cost and 
the level of government taxation on gas production ( ). The partial derivative of P with 
regard to p is non-negative, since increased gas prices will encourage increased 
exploration and production activities ceteris paribus, but the outcome of such activities 
is inherently uncertain. The partial derivative with regard to  is negative.  
 
Finally, an increase of gas import capacity from non-pivotal directions (Iw) will 
decrease the value of L. When gas transmission is a regulated business, which is the rule 
for the European Union, investments into additional natural gas transmission (including 
interconnectors) critically depend on the level of capital cost remuneration (e.g. 
weighted average cost of capital: WACC) provided through regulated transmission 
tariffs for the investors by the regulator ( ).  
 
The leverage function clearly indicates those policy options and control variables that 
are available for a government
5
 when it is to undermine dominant market positions 
based on the control of pivotal infrastructures. The p(L) function, denoted by Figure 3 
illustrates the assumed relationship between p and L: the path stronger leverage can 
undermine monopolistic gas wholesale pricing (denoted by po: oil-indexed) and enforce 
market based gas prices (denoted by pp: hub-based).  
 
                                                 
5
 For simplicity in the followings I mean government and regulatory measures together when I talk about 
„government measures”, although important price regulatory decisions are in the authority of regulatory 
institutions largely independent from the government.   
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Figure 3. The assumed form of the wholesale price function, p(L) 
 
We can see that the government has no direct influence on the wholesale gas price level: 
it is determined by demand and supply conditions, the latter having either a competitive 
(the case of pp) or concentrated structure (the case of po). What the government has 
control over is to combine its powers over end-customer gas prices, energy efficiency 
subsidies, gas production related taxation and infrastructure investment related 
regulatory incentives so that their combined effect puts the pivotal supplier under 
competitive pressure. In order to make those variables under government control more 
explicit, we can reformulate (2) in the following way:   
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1.3 Wholesale gas market characteristics and future scenarios 
 
The primary structural problem of the Hungarian gas wholesale market is related to the 
LTC with Russia that has been providing the majority of supply sources to the market 
since 1996. The Hungarian counterparty to this contract has always had a dominant 
(over 50%) wholesale market share.  
  
 $ 
po   
L   
pp   
1 -0.1   
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The subsequent market models that implemented the EU gas market liberalization rules 
under the Hungarian context have always been adjusted to acknowledge the existence of 
this LTC by first introducing the Public Utility market segment between 2004 and 2009 
and then the Universal Service market segment. The LTC holder has always had a 
preferential supply right to serve these market segments.  
The breakdown of oil indexed gas pricing started with increased short term trading 
through HAG
6
. The change in the dominant pricing regime might further accelerate 
from 2015 due to at least two major developments. First, the present LTC expire in 
2015. Second, the new Slovakia-Hungary interconnector will become commercially 
operational and thus the pivotal nature of the Ukraine-Hungary interconnector will be 
gone. I assume these developments create a unique opportunity to shift the nature of gas 
wholesale competition from an oligopolistic towards a more efficient one in Hungary. 
This could also mean a shift from oil-indexed dominated towards spot gas pricing.  
1.4 Distortive access rules to critical interconnectors 
 
Cross border interconnection capacities with third party access are the single most 
serious threat to a dominant gas wholesaler under the market conditions prevailing in 
Hungary. Certainly, this threat translates to real competition only when competitively 
priced gas becomes available to be shipped to the market and access is allowed to cross 
border pipeline capacities.  
By mid-2014 no regulated third party access is provided to the UA-HU interconnector 
in the Hungarian direction. The implementation of EU gas market rules in Ukraine due 
to obligations under its Energy Community membership might change this situation in 
the future. Access to HAG capacity is discriminative: while according to the Business 
Code of the gas system the rule for cross border gas transmission capacity allocation is 
auctioning in case of congestion, preferential access have been provided for two 
companies to the HAG capacity since 2011 by the government. Although the LTC 
holder has full access to the UA>HU interconnector without regulated third party 
access, capacity is also booked on HAG for the delivery of 20% of the LTC quantity. It 
                                                 
6
 The Austrian-Hungarian gas pipeline that was put in operation in 1996. 
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is critical for gas wholesale market development in Hungary, but still unclear, what 
capacity allocation rules will apply to the new SK-HU interconnector.  
 Modelling methodology: the EGMM7 2
 
For the upcoming simulations in section 7 I will use the European Gas Market Model 
that has been developed by my colleagues and myself to simulate the operation of an 
international wholesale natural gas market in whole Europe. Figure 4 shows the 
geographical scope of the model. Country codes denote the countries for which we have 
explicitly included the demand and supply side of the local market, as well as gas 
storages. Large external markets, such as Russia, Turkey, Libya, Algeria and LNG 
exporters are represented by exogenously assumed market prices, long-term supply 
contracts and physical connections to Europe.  
Figure 4. Post-2015 gas wholesale market model scenarios by REKK (2013) 
 
Given the input data, the model calculates a dynamic competitive market equilibrium 
for 35 European countries, and returns the market clearing prices, along with the 
production, consumption and trading quantities, storage utilization decisions and long-
term contract deliveries. 
                                                 
7
 The following description was provided by the gas modelling team of REKK, composed of András Kiss 
(principal model author), Borbála Tóth (team leader), László Paizs, Adrienn Selei and Péter Kotek.  
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Model calculations refer to 12 consecutive months, with a default setting of April-to-
March.
8
 Dynamic connections between months are introduced by the operation of gas 
storages (“you can only withdraw what you have injected previously”) and TOP 
constraints (minimum and maximum deliveries are calculated over the entire 12-month 
period, enabling contractual “make-up”). 
The European Gas Market Model consists of the following building blocks: (1) local 
demand; (2) local supply; (3) gas storages; (4) external markets and supply sources; (5) 
cross-border pipeline connections; (6) long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts; and (7) 
spot trading. The equilibrium state (the “result”) of the model can be described by a 
simple no-arbitrage condition across space and time.9  
Table 2. Summary of modelling input parameters and data sources 
Category 
Data Unit Source 
Consumption  
Annual Quantity 
Monthly distribution (% of annual 
quantity) 
Energy Community data,  
Eurostat, ENTSO-G 
Production  Minimum and maximum production 
Energy Community data,  
ENTSO-G 
Pipeline 
infrastructures 
Daily maximum flow 
GIE, ENTSO-G, 
Energy Community data 
Storage 
infrastructures 
Injection, withdrawal, 
working gas capacity 
GSE 
LNG 
infrastructures 
Capacity GLE, GIIGNL 
TOP contracts 
Yearly minimum maximum quantity  
Seasonal minimum and maximum quantity 
Gazprom, National Regulators 
Annual reports, Platts, Cedigaz 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The start of the modeling year can be set to any other month. 
9
 There is one, rather subtle, type of arbitrage which is treated as an externality, and hence not eliminated 
in the model. We assume that whenever long-term TOP contracts are (fully or partially) linked to an 
internal market price (such as the spot price in the Netherlands), the actors influencing that spot price 
have no regard to the effect of their behavior on the pricing of the TOP contract. In particular, reference 
market prices are not distorted downwards in order to cut the cost of long-term gas supplies from outside 
countries. 
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 Simulation scenarios and results 3
 
This section defines the simulation tasks and scenarios to test my hypotheses by the use 
of the EGMM. Controlled experiments are executed so that hypothetic scenarios or 
market/policy settings for Hungary are developed and their wholesale price outcomes 
are derived in a European market context that best represent actual supply, demand, 
infrastructure and contractual conditions. The scenarios are built around changes in few 
policy variables that are assumed to have the most significant wholesale price impact 
while the rest of the variables are controlled (unchanged). The Hungarian scenarios are 
not intended to be ‘realistic’ in terms of representing actual market conditions. Their 
aim is to represent stylised, sometimes extreme market settings in order to test the 
responsiveness of wholesale pricing outcomes to changes in some critical policy 
variables.  
 
3.1  Simulating the partial impacts of marginal policy changes on Leverage and gas 
wholesale prices under contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition   
 
Section 3 identified available government measures to undermine pivotal infrastructure 
positions. Demand side measures include those affecting end-customer prices (like the 
tax wedge between retail and wholesale gas prices or regulated tariff components) and 
exogenous energy efficiency investments. An important supply side measure is to 
encourage domestic gas production by a favourable investment environment, e.g. by 
setting low relative extraction taxes (royalty). An additional government measure is to 
encourage investment into gas import capacity from non-pivotal directions, e.g. by 
providing sufficiently high regulated return for such investments. According to the 
hypothesis, once the pivotal infrastructure position is undermined, oligopolistic (oil-
linked) gas prices will also be undermined. This hypothesis assumes a functional 
relationship between the measure to identify a pivotal infrastructure, namely the 
Leverage index as defined in (1) and gas wholesale prices, ceteris paribus (see Figure 
3).  
One way to test the above hypothesis would be to carry out the econometric estimation 
of the invers of the leverage function in (3):
10
 
                                                 
10
 Note that in (3) t and  helps to delink end-customer prices and production levels from wholesale gas 
price fluctuations respectively, thus resolving the endogenity of p and L apparent in (2). 
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p(L)  = p (r, t, E,  , ).     (4) 
However, the lack of sufficient data prohibited to follow this way.  
Instead, this section provides estimates on the functional relationship between p and L 
based on EGMM simulation values.  
The process of simulation is as follows. I start to run the model with a Hungarian 
reference case with a relatively high L value. In the reference case 2012 consumption 
and production data and 2014 infrastructure and tariff data is used for all countries 
endogenously modelled by EGMM. In the reference case the value of L is 0.35 for 
Hungary, Russian LTC is 100% oil-indexed priced and no spot Russian gas is available 
for the market.
11
  
The hypothesis is that due to the high positive L value for the reference case, the 
modelled wholesale gas price for Hungary will be closer to the oil-linked price. Next I 
generate (p;L) value pairs or observations by introducing marginal changes in the 
determinants of the L function: gas demand, domestic gas production and aggregate gas 
import capacity from non-Russia-Ukraine directions. I derive the partial impact of 
marginal policy changes on L and p values as follows:  
[1] From the reference case I start to reduce reference demand (110.75 TWh in 
2012)
12
 in marginal blocks (5 TWh) until the L value reaches -0.2, ceteris 
paribus and derive related wholesale price estimates.  
[2] From the reference case (25.2 TWh annual maximum production capacity) I 
start to increase maximum capacity of domestic production in marginal blocks 
(5 TWh) until the L value reaches -0.2, ceteris paribus and derive related 
wholesale price estimates. 
                                                 
11
 In light of recent Russian LTC renegotiations and the spreading practice of mixed spot-oil indexed LTC 
pricing the assumption of 100% oil indexed pricing by Russia might seem unrealistic. However, my 
objective here is to test the capacity of alternative policy measures to put pressure on oil indexed pricing. 
To develop a theory on Russian gas pricing under regulatory and competitive pressures is a topic for 
another study. 
12
 During the calculations it is assumed that 1 Bcm = 9.77 TWh 
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[3] From the reference case I start to increase import capacity from non-Russia-
Ukraine directions in marginal blocks (5 TWh/year) until the L value reaches  
-0.2, ceteris paribus and derive related wholesale price estimates. Two 
alternative sub-scenarios have been developed to test the impact of alternative 
development options. 
 [3A] In the first case only the HAG capacity was expanded by marginal 
blocks (5 TWh/year) until L reached a sufficiently low value  
(< -0.2). 
[3B] In the second case the SK-HU interconnector was implemented first in 
marginal blocks (5 TWh/year) until it reached the actual planned capacity 
(127 GWh/day SK-HU capacity) and then HAG expanded until L reached a 
sufficiently low value (< -0.2). To reach  
L= -0.2 ceteris paribus next to the SK-HU capacity an extension of AT-HU 
capacity with 40 GWh/day was also necessary.     
The EGMM derives yearly average wholesale price estimates under contract (LTC) and 
infrastructure (interconnection capacity) constrained perfect competition. Thus the 
results of the above simulations will be informative on the partial wholesale price 
impacts of different policy measures to improve leverage for Hungary under the specific 
assumptions about contract and infrastructure constrained perfect competition inherent 
for the EGMM model. 
 
3.2 Simulation results 
 
Figures 5-8 summarise the results of the first simulation round. The results illuminate 
the capacity of policies discussed in the context of the Leverage function in (2) to 
undermine Russian oil-indexed gas pricing when Russia is not willing to adjust its 
pricing policy to apparent competitive pressure. Modelled German prices plus 
transmission tariffs from Germany to Hungary are used as an approximation for hub-
based pricing.  
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Figure 5. Modelled impact of marginal demand reductions on leverage and gas wholesale prices 
 
Figure 6. Modelled impact of marginal domestic production increases on leverage and gas 
wholesale prices 
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Figure 7. Modelled impact of marginal HAG capacity expansions on leverage and gas wholesale 
prices 
 
 
Figure 8. Modelled impact of marginal SK-HU and follow up HAG capacity expansions on leverage 
and gas wholesale prices 
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the above results. 
 In the reference case the modelled Hungarian wholesale price (34.1 €/MWh) is 
only 6% below the oil-indexed price (36.2 €/MWh). The oil indexed price is 
24%, the reference price is 17% over the hub-based price (29.2 €/MWh).    
 The above simulation results reproduce the hypothetic functional form 
illustrated on Figure 3. All three policies by themselves (and most probably in 
combination) can lead to a gradual move from close-to oil-indexed to close-to 
hub-based gas wholesale pricing.  
 At L ≈ 0 values all partial policies result in 10% wholesale price decrease 
compared to the reference case.  
 To encourage domestic production to increase and the implementation of the 
SK-HU interconnector seem to be the most efficient policies to arrive at hub-
based wholesale prices at L values around -0.2.    
 The least effective policy seems to be the expansion of only the HAG capacity 
due to congestion at the German Austrian interconnector.     
An overall conclusion is that under only contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition, policies that result in an L value ≈ -0.2 are sufficient to manage an almost 
full transition from oil-indexed to hub based gas wholesale pricing in Hungary. An 
exception is when only the HAG capacity is expanded. The partial impact of demand 
reduction policies seems to be a bit slower to produce close-to hub based gas wholesale 
prices.   
 
3.3  Simulation of the impact of additional market and regulatory distortions on gas 
wholesale prices in Hungary  
 
In the second round of simulations additional market and regulatory distortions are 
introduced and their impacts on gas wholesale price development investigated. The 
simulations are related to the testing of the hypothesis formulated in the Introduction 
about the major obstacles to moving from oil-indexed to spot gas wholesale pricing in 
Hungary. The existence of a pivotal infrastructure, gas wholesale market concentration 
and distortive cross border capacity access rules were assumed to be the most 
detrimental market characteristics for spot pricing to develop on the Hungarian market 
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(see also Table 1 on the assumed relationship between the first two obstacles and likely 
gas wholesale pricing regimes).  
For simulation purposes I define two possible, stylised states with regard to each of the 
three market/policy characteristics and thus create 8 possible market/policy scenarios 
for Hungary to compare. As in the case of previous simulations, the reference case 
includes 2012 consumption and production data and 2014 infrastructure and tariff data 
for all countries endogenously modelled by EGMM except for Hungary. For the 
Hungarian market I will control for demand, production and underground storage 
characteristics so that they will remain unchanged in all the subsequent simulations.  
In the eight simulation scenarios the following alternative states will apply with regard 
to the investigated market/policy characteristics: 
 Pivotal infrastructure. In the Hungarian context, the potential pivotal 
infrastructure is the UA>HU interconnector. I will represent the existence versus 
the lack of its pivotal position by two alternative infrastructure settings. The first 
will reflect interconnection conditions in the reference case with an L value of 
0.35 (UA>HU is pivotal). In the alternative case L = -0.2 due to the 
implementation of the fully bi-directional SK>HU interconnector and further 
extension of HAG.    
 Market concentration. The concentration of the Hungarian wholesale market is 
represented by two alternative LTC volumes. High concentration translates to a 
8 Bcm (78.16 TWh)/year, 100% oil-indexed (36.2 €/MWh) LTC with ± 15% 
flexibility (see dominant wholesaler model in section 1.3). Low market 
concentration is represented by a 2 BCM (19.54 TWh)/year, 100% oil-indexed 
LTC with the same flexibility (see Universal Service + Competition scenario in 
the same section). Russian spot gas is not available in any of the two scenarios 
(having a very high price). 
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 Distortive access to interconnectors. With regard to capacity booking for LTC 
holders two alternatives are considered again. In the first type of scenario (see 
Scenarios 1, 2, 5 and 6 below) LTC gas can only be delivered to the Hungarian 
market through the UA>HU interconnector. This is the stylized case when the 
regulator prohibits capacity booking for LTC holders on interconnectors falling 
under regulated third party access rules. In the second type of scenario regulated 
third party access interconnectors are used first for delivering LTC gas and if 
needed for larger contracts, the remaining amount flows to the Hungarian market 
through the UA>HU interconnector. More precisely, in Scenario 7 70% of 
contracted quantity is delivered through HAG (up to full capacity) and for the 
delivery of the remaining 30% UA>HU capacity is used. In Scenario 8 100% 
LTC gas flows on HAG, in Scenario 3, 55% flows on SK-HU (up to its full 
capacity) and the remaining 45% on HAG. Finally, in scenario 4 100% LTC gas 
flows on the SK-HU interconnector. Only remaining capacity, if any, is 
available for spot trading on these interconnectors in case of second type 
Scenarios.    
Table 3 summarises the major characteristics of the simulation scenarios.  
Since Scenario 2 is the closest to a competitive market/policy setting (strong leverage, 
low market concentration, no cross border capacity blocking), I expect this scenario to 
result in a gas wholesale price closest to hub-based prices (approximated by modelled 
German wholesale prices). On the other end, being the least competitive setting, I 
expect Scenario 7 (low leverage, high market concentration, cross-border capacity 
blocking) to result in closest to oil-indexed prices. 
Table 3. Alternative market/policy setting simulation scenarios 
 
 
3.4 Simulation results 
 
Tables 4 summarises the results of the second simulation round by individual scenarios. 
Hungarian and German wholesale prices and profits from LTC gas sales are indicated. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
L =  0,35 (2011) x x x x
L =  - 0,2 x x x x
LTC: 8 Bcm x x x x
LTC: 2 Bcm x x x x
UA>HU: 100% x x x x
UA>HU: 0%, SK>HU (HAG) x x x x
Leverage
Market concentration
Capacity blocking
Assumptions
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Profit from LTC is the difference between the revenue of the LTC holder from selling 
the TOP (at least ACQ-flexibility) volume at equilibrium market price and the cost of 
purchasing it at 100% oil indexed prices. 
 
Table 4. Wholesale prices and LTC profits in the different market/policy simulation Scenarios 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results. 
 All the scenarios result in negative profits for LTC contract holders. This 
indicates that 100% oil indexed gas is already under heavy competition in the 
EU and also the Hungarian market.  
 As expected, Scenario 2 provides for the wholesale price closest to hub based 
pricing at moderate LTC loss. 
 Scenario 4 is a version of Scenario 2 with distortive access of LTC holders to the 
SK-HU interconnector. The results indicate that distortive access in case of a 
small LTC and abundant interconnection capacity falling under regulated third 
party access rules results in minimum LTC related negative profits at moderate 
price increase compared to Scenario 2. Thus this could be considered as a loss 
minimization scenario. 
 Scenarios 5 and 7 indicate that large volume LTCs produce the highest negative 
profits for LTC holders. As for Scenario 5, the combination of low leverage, 
high LTC volume and full spot competition through HAG creates the largest 
LTC related financial loss. 
 The lesson from Scenario 7 is that the gigantic financial loss of Scenario 5 can 
be reduced by distortive access to HAG at the cost of a very high wholesale 
price increase on the Hungarian market. Scenario 7 indeed provides for the worst 
combination of market/policy conditions and indeed results in close to oil-
indexed wholesale prices.  
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
HU price (€/MWh) 30,7 30,2 31,8 31,6 30,8 31 34,9 35
DE price (€/MWh) 27,4 27,5 27,5 27,4 27,4 27,6 27,2 27,4
HU-DE Price spread (€/MWh) 3,3 2,7 4,3 4,2 3,4 3,4 7,7 7,6
Profit from long-term contract 
(m€)
-574 -152 -267 -29 -580 -139 -297 -89
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 Scenario 8 is a version of Scenario 7 with reduced LTC contract volume. While 
this scenario also results in a close to oil-indexed wholesale price, the reduced 
contract volume significantly decreases LTC related financial losses under 
conditions of low leverage and full spot competition through HAG.      
Next we can compare the performance of Scenarios along the major investigated policy 
dimensions in terms of the average wholesale price and the average LTC profit they 
result in.  
First, there is a significant trade-off between wholesale price levels and the extent of 
distortive access to regulated third party access interconnectors. Distortive access 
moderates the financial loss of the LTC holder company at the cost of increasing 
wholesale prices. To the contrary, undistorted competition through regulated third party 
access interconnectors brings wholesale prices closest to hub-based levels at the cost of 
significant financial loss for the incumbent wholesaler.  
Second, a small LTC seems to help minimizing LTC related losses while large LTC 
scenarios produce the highest financial losses for incumbents.  
Finally, better leverage matters mostly pricewise. Scenarios with L= -0.2 value 
produced an average wholesale price being the second closest to the hub-based price. 
 Summary of results and directions for future research 4
 
This study identified the principal obstacles to a transition from monopolistic (oil-
indexed) natural gas wholesale pricing to hub-based pricing in Hungary as (i) the 
exclusive control over a pivotal infrastructure (namely the UA-HU interconnector), (ii) 
high level market concentration and (iii) the foreclosure of the Hungarian gas wholesale 
market by blocking capacities of regulated third party access interconnectors.  
It introduced the leverage function to help the consistent analysis of available 
government measures to undermine dominant market positions based on the control of 
pivotal infrastructures. It also assumed a functional relationship between leverage and 
the prevailing gas wholesale price so that under contract and infrastructure constrained 
perfect competition a sufficiently low leverage value (<-0.2) would bring about close to 
hub-based gas wholesale prices. However, when high level market concentration and 
additional regulatory distortions in the form of distortive interconnection access spoil 
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perfect competition, the relationship between leverage and the prevailing wholesale gas 
price becomes unclear.  
In order to assess the efficiency of available supply side, production and infrastructure 
development related policy measures to undermine a dominant market position and to 
encourage a transition from oil-linked to hub-based gas pricing in Hungary, controlled 
experiments or simulations were carried out with a contract and infrastructure 
constrained perfect competition gas market model, the European Gas Market Model. 
Additional simulations tested the wholesale price impacts of 8 stylised market/policy 
settings for Hungary defined along the dimensions of leverage, wholesale market 
concentration and access rules to critical interconnectors. 
The simulation results provided strong support for the research hypotheses. They could 
reproduce the hypothetic functional form between leverage and related gas wholesale 
price outcomes. It was found that under contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition those policies resulting in a leverage value around -0.2 are sufficient to 
manage an almost full transition from oil-indexed to hub based gas wholesale pricing in 
Hungary. To encourage domestic production and the implementation of the SK-HU 
interconnector seem to be the most effective policies to arrive at hub-based wholesale 
prices.   
Once the possibility of high level market concentration (in the form of a large volume 
LTC) and distortive access to non-Russian-Ukrainian interconnectors is introduced, the 
market/policy setting with strong leverage, low market concentration and no cross 
border capacity blocking results in a gas wholesale price closest to hub-based prices. 
The higher market concentration (i.e. the volume of a LTC) becomes, the higher the 
financial risk the LTC holding dominant gas wholesaler is facing. Simulations also 
found a significant trade-off between wholesale price levels and the extent of distortive 
access to regulated third party access interconnectors. Distortive access moderates the 
financial loss of the LTC holder company at the cost of increasing wholesale prices. To 
the contrary, undistorted competition through regulated third party access 
interconnectors brings wholesale prices closest to hub-based levels at the cost of 
significant financial loss for the incumbent wholesaler.  
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